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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH f 
PIa i nt if £-Respondent, 
v. 
ALLEN BOYD MILL-EP, 
Defendant-A pp e11a nt, 
Case No. 8602 45-CA 
Category N- . 2 
BRIEF ? RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
*u„ c .:* p r o p e r l y deny d e f e n d a r : . 
m o t i o n t o r,:\i:try~ e v i d e n c e s e i z e d p r .a: a w a r r a n t ? 
» i *. * . 5 d o u b t t h a t 
t h e p l a n t s s e i z e d from d e f e n d a n t ' xer.i^r ~ *>.:< m a r i j u a n a ? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
De f en da i 11, A1 1 e i i Bo y f :I M i l l e r , wa i. c h a r g e d w i t h 
p r o d u c t i o n ot a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e
 f a t h i r d ( i e g r e e f e l o n y , 
. J i i i H f,rTAIl C Mnf ANN § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i ) I I ' - I M . I UihfMided ] q fr - . 
9 - 1 0 ) . A i t e i d bencl :i t r i a l , d e f endar i t was found g u i l t y a s 
c h a r g e d . T h e c o u r t s e n t e n c e d h im t o a t e r m o £ z e r o t o f i v e y e a r s 
i i! t. il i *. 1 1 1 a hi {; t a l t 1 Il r :i s o :i I , i: • i I 1: s t a;;;, e d e x e c i 11 i o n o £ 11 :i e s e • r :t t e n c e 
aiid placed hin un probation (a condition c 1 which was that he 
serve BI x months in the Salt Lake County Jail ) (R. 147-48 ^pon 
d e £ e n d a i \ t" s a p p • 1 i c a t i o i i, t h e c o i 11: t g r a i 11 e d i: :i i m a i c r Li f i r. f 
p r o b a b 1 e cause a n d s e t b a i 1 pending a p p e a 1 a t $ 1 rj, 0 0 0 {h, 1 5 0 ) , 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was tried on stipulated facts (State's 
Exhibit 8-S—a copy of which is attached as Appendix A). The 
sole factual issue presented to the trial court was whether the 
State's evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the plants 
cultivated by defendant and seized by police officers were 
marijuana. A memorandum decision written by the court thoroughly 
discusses the evidence presented by both parties on this issue 
(R. 125-29) (attached as Appendix B)• Because that decision 
accurately summarizes the testimony given (R. 215-314), the State 
refers this Court to it for facts relevant to the issue of plant 
identification. 
The trial court also prepared a complete memorandum 
decision on defendant's motion to suppress (R. 61-72) (attached 
as Appendix C). Because it also accurately reflects the evidence 
presented below (R. 167-68), the State refers the Court to it for 
facts relevant to the suppression issue. 
SUMMAfiX QF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to present any grounds for reversing 
the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress evidence 
seized from his residence pursuant to a warrant. The trial 
court's refusal to suppress the challenged evidence was proper 
under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g). 
The State presented sufficient evidence to prove that 
the plants seized from defendant's residence were marijuana. 
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ARSUMgNX 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TQ SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT 
TO A WARRANT. 
Prior to trial , defendar filer *• :. *. suppress 
the ev idencp of ruari jtiai ia prod ,: i ants* 
equipmen . • . t:t iat was seiz- i ... :. residence hw police 
officers pursuai 11 to a search warrant, 1n that motion, defendant 
a r g u e d t h a t (] ) 11 i e a f f i d a v i t s u ppo r t i ng t h e w a r r an t w a r, 
insufficient to establish probable cause; (2) the affidavit 
contained false and misleading statements which, when deleted, 
1 e 1: t i ns u£ f ic ie , 1 ii if or n t a 1 i• i)i: I t • : i I a 1«J i > 11 | J I c > i » a b 1 fj ca iJ s*'; I J) 
the warrant contained a "no knock" ci.au.1 t uliit h wau nut supported 
by information in the affidavit; ami \4\ tin quod faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule was not applicable in i h i L i < M . 3 7-
6 0, 7 8 ) . After hearing testimony, the trial cour t refused to 
suppress the cha 1 1 enged evidence (R» 61 72, Appendix C ) . On 
appea1, defendant c1aims that this was reversib 1 e error, 
reasserting the arguments for suppression that he did below , 
E a r ft i [ t h use
 (i n j 11 na«n t y w ill 1M ,* 11 i i e s s v d i 11 t 111.11 
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A. Applicable Standard 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-12(g) 
(1982)J1 is the controlling rule for all motions to suppress 
evidence for an allegedly unlawful search or seizure. Although 
originally enacted by the legislature, Rule 12(g) was formally 
in 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as a rule of procedure In Re: 
Rules of Procedure. 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1985) , pursuant to its 
rulemaking authority under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, the trial court's ruling should be 
reviewed in the context of that rule. 
* Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of evidence or 
the suppression of evidence pursuant to this section or at trial, 
upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the suppression of 
evidence shall not be granted unless the court finds the 
violation upon which it is based to be both a substantial 
violation and not committed in good faith. xhe court shall set 
forth its reasons for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in all cases be 
deemed substantial if one or more of the following is established 
by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, willful, malicious, 
shocking to the conscience of the court or was a result of the 
practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant to a general 
order of that agency: 
(ii) The violation was inteded only to harass without 
legitimate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was acting in 
good faith under this section, the court shall consider, in 
addition to any other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and seizure 
standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future 
violations of search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a 
search warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on previous specific 
directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes that the 
search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the peace officer or governmental agency must 
then, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good faith 
actions of the peace officer. 
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B Sufficiency of the Affidavit 
I t lis w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t "wi lJ 
n I, I " ! in 1 ad1 iin F, f. 111 i.l 11 
evidence unless it clearly appears that tru- i^ -wei court was in 
err.; , i ^ ^ - . Gallegos, 7., \> -d 7> ' . - • re 1^: . £^SL 
Al&2 State .*..-. ^ 
consider- - c a,:^.^ • • .- i, ^  * . *::i"!:=*.* "i 
SUppor ul a S e a u n Wdliant, * I cu ieviewilly ^ w u U snOuid p. 
great pference t^ * ^ aoistrate's deternuna+-inn of prohaf--
cause. -Lot*. v. Romero, 66 f ; *, , t^ : 19 8:0 * cuing 
SEil i*** . .
 s AS stated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983): 
[W]e have r e p e a t e d l y said that after-the-fact 
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an 
affidavit should not take the form of djg. novo 
review. A magistrate's "determination of 
probable cause should be paid great deference 
by reviewing courts." Spinelli, supra, at 
419. "A grudging or negative attitude t y 
reviewing courts toward warrants,11 
Ventresca, 380 U.S., at 108, is inconsistent 
with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference 
for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; 
"court s s h ou1d not invalidate warr an t[s] by 
interpreting affidavitls] in a 
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, 
manner." Id # at 10 9. 
462 U.S. at 236. Ai i 3, ""'[a]] thougt i in a particular case it may 
not be easy to de termi ne whe ther an affidavit demonstrates the 
existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or 
m a r g i n a 1 c a s e s i I 11 :i i s a i: e a s I: i o \ i ] d b e J a r g e 1 y d e t e r ni i n e d b ;r t h e 
preference to be accorded to warrai its. f" (3ates * 46 2 U.S. at 23 7 
n. io (quoting United States Vt Ventresga# 380 u.s. io2f 109 
(1965)). The Utah Supreme Court has embraced the approach 
adopted in SLal^ S.* making clear that it will view the affidavit in 
its entirety and in a commonsense fashion to determine whether 
the magistrate had "'a substantial basis for . . . concluding]1 
that probable cause existed." State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 
1102 (Utah 1985) (citing Jones v, United States, 362 o.s. 257, 
271 (I960))- £g£ Al££ State v. Esoinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 
1986). 
The affidavit of Detective Stewart Smith, which 
defendant challenges, contained substantial information upon 
which the magistrate could have based a finding of probable cause 
for issuance of the search warrant (a copy of the affidavit is 
attached as Appendix D). The trial court accurately summarized 
that information as follows: 
The affidavit pointed out numerous 
factors that led Officer Smith, a trained 
narcotics officer with extensive experience, 
to believe that the residence was being used 
as a cultivation center for the mass 
production of marijuana, mushrooms, or some 
other unlawful substance. Among the factors 
supporting this belief was information 
regarding the physical appearance of the 
residence, namely, that the roof of the 
residence had two large vents, which were 
visible only from the back of the house, and 
had been painted the same color as the roof; 
two swamp coolers had been vented into the 
basement of the residence through basement 
window wells; the basement windows had been 
boarded closed and dirt bermed around them; 
several grow lights were stacked near the 
coolers; when the side door of the garage was 
opened, a large furnace-like apparatus with 
two smokestacks was visible; the garage 
windows had been boarded closed in the same 
manner as the basement windows; the back yard 
contained three large steel gardening sheds; 
and the residence had three electrical power 
boxes. 
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The above information was gathered 
through actual observations of the polict 
officers involved in the investigation. This 
investigation was begun pursuant to a 
complaint by neighbors in the area who 
reported that vehicles stopped for brief 
periods at the residence in the early morning 
hours, and that a large U-Haul truck was 
loaded and unloaded through the side door of 
the garage, which is not visible from the 
street. These reports from neighbors led 
Officer Smith to conduct observations of the 
residence, and to further investigate the 
information observed. 
The observations of the police officers 
corroborated the reports of the neighbors and 
led Officer Smith, prompted by his narcotics 
training and experience, to investigate the 
Utah Power & Light records for [defendant's] 
residence. These records were submitted with 
the affidavit to [the magistrate]. The power 
consumption for the residence was four to 
five times in excess of the normal use for a 
home of the size of [defendant's] residence. 
Further, Utah Power & Light told Officer 
Smith that [defendant] denied meter readers 
access to his property, but paid his bills 
without complaint, although they were 
sometimes in excess of $2,000.00 a month. 
The affidavit also included information 
from a credit check indicating that 
[defendant] was self-employed by Miller's 
Auto Body Shop which, after a search of 
business licenses, appeared not to exist. 
In addition to the information in the 
affidavit suggesting a sophisticated 
cultivation operation, the affidavit provided 
to [the magistrate] contained information 
regarding drug-related criminal involvement 
of [defendant] and two other individuals 
believed to have frequented the residence. 
The affidavit stated that [defendant] had 
previously been arrested for possession of 
marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms, and 
mentioned that Franklin David Spain, who used 
[defendant's] residence as his address, had 
been arrested in the last year for possession 
of marijuana. The Kane County Sheriff's 
records indicated that [defendant] had been 
arrested on a DUI/Illegal Possession of a 
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Controlled Substance charge, and that 
Franklin David Spain was present in the 
vehicle at the time. The police report 
indicates that marijuana, marijuana seeds, 
and "what appears to be mushrooms" were 
involved. The report further shows Franklin 
David Spain as listing his address as being 
7889 South 3850 West, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
which address was the subject of the search 
in question here. The attachments to the 
affidavit which were considered by [the 
magistrate] stated that the police officers 
had observed an automobile owned by one Vann 
Larson, "a known drug user," coming and going 
from the premises in the early morning hours, 
staying only a short time before leaving. 
Officer Smith fs affidavit provided ,to 
[the magistrate] a statement that he believed 
that [defendant's] residence was being used 
for cultivation of marijuana or mushrooms. 
The affidavit detailed the connection between 
the information contained in the affidavit 
and Officer Smith's conclusion that the 
residence was being used for an unlawful 
purpose. 
(R.62-65; Appendix Ci). The information provided by Officer 
Smith was largely gathered in his one and one-half month 
investigation immediately prior to the issuance of the warrant 
(Appendix D). Viewed in its entirety and in a commonsense 
fashion, the affidavit clearly was constitutionally sufficient 
under the "totality of circumstances" test consistently applied 
by the Utah Supreme Court. Nevertheless, defendant argues that 
the affidavit was deficient because much of the information in 
the affidavit came from unidentified neighbors whose statements 
to the police were made on unspecified dates and whose 
reliability had not been established, and the facts stated in the 
affidavit were as consistent with innocent conduct as with 
guilty. 
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First, nearly all of the information received from the 
neighbors was independently verified by the police; their 
statements to the police merely caused an investigation to occur. 
Second, defendant's neighbors, who gave no indication of 
participation in the alleged criminal activity, were not the type 
of •informants" whose reliability must be independently 
established. £&£ ££&££ v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983) 
("Veracity is generally assumed when the information comes from 
an 'average citizen who is in a position to supply information by 
virtue of having been a crime victim or witness.1")• Third, the 
circumstances related by the neighbors and observed by the police 
can not reasonably be characterized as being as consistent with 
innocent conduct as with guilty. Although plausible, defendant's 
suggestion that the evidence was just as likely indicative of 
tomato, flower, mushroom, or other legal indoor cultivation, is 
not very reasonable under the circumstances. Persons usually do 
not conduct large-scale indoor growing operations in a residence, 
unless they wish to conceal that fact. Furthermore, Smith's 
experience as a drug enforcement officer justifiably led him to 
believe that marijuana or some other illegal substance was being 
cultivated in defendant's home. Contrary to defendant's 
contention, a police officer's experience and training and the 
conclusions the officer draws from factors that may appear 
insignificant to the untrained eye may justifiably be relied upon 
in determining probable cause. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 
1088 (Utah 1986). £&e ai££ united States v, Cortez, 449 u.s. 411 
(1981). Finally, defendant's claim that State v. McPherson, 40 
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Wash.App. 298, 698 P.2d 563 (1985), and State v. Hiobv, 26 
Wash.App. 457, 613 P.2d 1192 (1980), are controlling can be 
disposed of summarily. The information disclosed in the 
affidavits at issue in those cases was scant compared to that 
contained in Smith's affidavit. And, insofar as Higby suggests 
that the neighbors1 observations, which were not specified by 
date in the affidavit, may have been stale information, those 
observations were independently verified by the police in the one 
and one-half month period immediately prior to the issuance of 
the warrant, thereby eliminating any issue of staleness. There 
appears to be no question about whether the information from the 
police was sufficiently current to establish probable cause. See 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). 
In sum, because the information contained in the 
affidavit provided the magistrate with "'a substantial basis for 
. . . concluding]' that probable cause existed," Anderson. 701 
P.2d at 1102, the trial court correctly rejected defendant's 
attack on the affidavit's sufficiency. There being no violation 
of the protections against unlawful search and seizure in that 
regard, suppression would neither be required nor warranted under 
Rule 12(g). Even if this Court were to decide that the affidavit 
was technically inadequate, the warrant was reasonably relied 
upon by the executing officers who, under an objective 
reasonableness test, had no basis for believing it to be invalid. 
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£££ UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-23-12 (1982);^ United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984). Under the circumstancesf any violation was 
neither substantial nor committed in bad faith. 
c. Allegedly False Statements in Affidavit 
Defendant argues that severalAstatements contained in 
the affidavit or the documents attached thereto were made by 
Smith either intentionally and knowinglyf or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. He claims that, when those false 
statements are deleted from the affidavit, there remain 
insufficient factual allegations to establish probable cause, a 
circumstance that requires suppression of the seized evidence 
under Pelawflre V. £L£EL]l£r 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
Under Franks. a defendant must make: 
a substantial preliminary showing that a 
false statement knowingly and intentionally, 
or with reckless disregard for the truth, was 
included by the affiant in the warrant 
affidavit, and if the allegedly false 
statement is necessary to the finding of 
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires 
that a hearing be held at the defendant's 
request. 
438 U.S at 155-56. At any hearing, the defendant then carries 
the burden of showing such by a preponderance pf the evidence. 
Ibid. The trial court correctly rejected defendant's claim 
z
 Section 77-21-12 provides: 
Pursuant to the standards described in section 77-35-12(g) 
property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant shall 
not be suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceeding unless 
the unlawful conduct of the peace officer is shown to be 
substantial. Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered 
substantial and in bad faith if the warrant was obtained with 
malicious purpose and without probable cause or was executed 
maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the warrant or 
with unnecessary severity. 
-11-
concerning the allegedly false statements identified on appeal. 
It stated: 
The defendant further argues that the 
affidavit contains false statements made 
knowingly or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. This Court agrees with 
defendants assertion that if a false 
statement, made knowingly or with reckless 
disregard for the truth# was included in an 
affidavit for a search warrant, and was 
necessary for a finding of probable cause, 
then the Motion to Suppress must be granted. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)• The 
defendant, however, has offered no evidence 
that any of the officers knowingly, or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth included any 
allegedly false information in the affidavit. 
Even if information included in the affidavit 
is false, there is absolutely no evidence 
suggesting that such information was included 
knowingly or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. Furthermore, the evidence 
demonstrates that all of the alleged 
misstatements complained of by the defendant 
were based upon reasonably reliable 
information such as official public 
documents, business records, police reports, 
and conversations with sheriffs previously 
involved with the suspect. 
The defendant complains that the 
following statement included in the affidavit 
is false and misleading: 
A traffic survey of the area 
identified several cars for 
which ownership records identified 
a known drug user coming and going 
from the premises in the early 
morning hours. These vehicles stay 
only a short time, and then leave. 
The defendant argues that the statement 
is false, and that the charges against the 
owner of one of the cars identified as a 
"known drug user" had been dismissed, and 
that the statement implies that several cars 
were identified as belonging to known drug 
users. Although inartfully phrased, this 
Court will not hold an officer to be held to 
a standard of perfection in his wording of 
affidavits. A careful reading of the 
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statement shows that several cars were 
observed, and fine, of the cars belonged to a 
known drug user* The argument that the 
statement is false because the charges 
against the owner of that one car were 
dropped is unpersuasive, inasmuch as this 
Court does not believe that a person must be 
convicted of a drug-related offense before he 
can be known to the police as a drug user. 
Another misstatement alleged by the 
defendant are the statements in the affidavit 
concerning the drug charges against 
[defendant] and Spain, The defendant 
contends that [he] was not arrested for 
possession of psilocybin mushrooms and 
marijuana as indicated in the affidavit, and 
that any drug-related charges against 
[defendant] were subsequently dismissed. The 
evidence, however, clearly shows that this 
statement was based upon the relevant police 
records and conversations with the sheriff 
involved, which clearly indicated that 
[defendant] had been arrested and charged 
with possession of a controlled substance, 
and that the arrest involved marijuana and 
"what appeared to be mushrooms." The fact 
that the possession charge was subsequently 
dismissed is irrelevant, inasmuch as the 
statement in the affidavit contains no 
information as to the disposition of the 
charge, and such disposition was unknown to 
the officers at the time of the search. 
Finally, defendant argues that the 
affidavit contained a false statement 
concerning the address of Franklin David 
Spain as being that of the residence which 
was searched. This information in the 
affidavit, however, was based upon 
information given by Spain himself to the 
Kane County Sheriff indicating that his 
residence was, in fact, the address which was 
the subject of this search. Furthermore, 
neighbors in the area had reported seeing 
Spain at the residence in question. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant 
is correct in his argument that misstatements 
were knowingly or recklessly included in the 
affidavit, even without these alleged 
misstatements, the affidavit included 
information concerning the intensive 
cultivation operations, drug-related criminal 
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activity on the part of at least one 
individual reasonably believed to frequent 
the premises, and the opinion of a narcotics 
officer with extensive training and 
experience in such investigations* This 
information, independent of the alleged 
misstatements, is sufficient to establish 
probable cause for a warrant to issue. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
(R. 68-71; Appendix C). This ruling is entirely consistent with 
Zx^nksL. C£. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant suggests that, if the Court were to find that 
several of Smith's statements were false and made .intentionally 
and knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, but were 
not material to the probable cause determination, it should, 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, require 
suppression of the evidence. This suggestion to interpret 
article I, section 14 differently than Franks interpreted the 
fourth amendment should not detain the Court long. First, the 
state constitutional argument was not presented to the trial 
court, and therefore should not be considered for the first time 
on appeal. See State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 
1985). Second, although the Nielsen decision suggests that 
defendant's state constitutional argument might be considered by 
the Utah Supreme Court, that Court has never seen fit to construe 
article I, section 14, whose wording is nearly identical to the 
fourth amendment, differently than the United States Supreme 
Court has the fourth amendment. It has traditionally construed 
the state provision as having the same scope of protection as the 
fourth amendment. £££, e.g., State v. Jasso. 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 
P.2d 844 (1968); State V, CrJSgPla, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 
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(1968); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976). Even its most 
recent decisions continue to reflect this tradition. £££ e.g.• 
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125. 126 (Utah 1987) (following 
federal standard for investigative, stop under article I, section 
14); State v, Hvoh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (holding that, 
as under federal law, inventory searches are permitted by article 
If section 14). An intermediate appellate court in a two-tiered 
appellate system generally should refrain from performing its 
"law-declaring" function in cases of great moment. State v. 
Grawien. 123 Wis.2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818 <Wis. App. 
1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1986) (authorizing 
certification of issues to Supreme Court). Clearly, a decision 
to depart from Franks on state constitutional grounds would be a 
case of great moment, given the Utah Supreme Court's history of 
construing article I, section 14 strictly along federal lines. 
D . "No KnocK" Warrant 
Based upon the affiant's statements that physical harm 
might result if notice were given (due to a belief that two large 
dogs were on the premises), and that the property sought could be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, the magistrate 
authorized execution of the search warrant without notice. See 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-10(2) (1982).3 Although he provides no 
constitutional anaylysis of the question, defendant contends that 
the "no knock" warrant was issued and executed in violation of S 
77-23-10(2) and the constitutional prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Because defendant does not support his constitutional 
argument with any legal analysis or authority, the Court should 
not address that issue. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support [her] 
argu#ment by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule 
on i t . " ) ; state v. Honfla Motorcycle* P.2d , ut. c t . App. 
No. 860190-CA, slip op. at 5 n. 4 (filed April 8, 1987). 
Furthermore, the relevant case law suggests that a "knock and 
announce" rule is not constitutionally required. See palia v. 
United States. 441 U.S. 238 (1978). 
As for the alleged misapplication of S 77-23-10(2), it 
appears the magistrate had adequate grounds for issuing a no 
notice warrant. Large dogs which could have posed a physical 
J
 Section 77-23-10(2) provides: 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into 
any building, room, conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, 
the officer executing the warrant may use such force as is 
reasonably necessary to enter: 
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the 
magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The magistrate shall so direct 
only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical 
harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
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hazard to the executing officers had been seen on the premises, 
and, as in most drug raids, the officers could have justifiably 
assumed that any persons inside defendant's residence would 
attempt to destroy evidence if given notice that the police had 
arrived with a search warrant. Similar permissible assumptions 
related to the illegal drug business are recognized by the 
courts. See, e.g. , State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1092 (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring in result) (police officer "reasonably could 
assume that those participating in moving large quantities of 
illegal drugs over long distances might be armed to protect 
themselves from criminals who might attempt to 'rip off a drug 
dealer"). However, beyond there being a substantial basis for a 
no notice warrant, defendant has made no showing that any 
conceivable violation was either substantial or not committed in 
good faith. The officers appear to have reasonably relied on the 
no notice authorization given by the magistrate. Therefore, 
defendant has presented no grounds for suppression under Rule 
12(g). &££ Alfifl, S 77-23-12; United Stately. Leon. 
E. Constitutionality of Rule 12(g) 
Defendant attacks the constitutionality of Rule 12(g). 
However, because the Utah Supreme Court has formally adopted Rule 
12(g) (presumably with the belief that it is constitutional), 
this Court is not in a position to nullify that rule on 
constitutional grounds. Such a ruling would not only usurp the 
Supreme Court's rulemaking authority, but would also represent a 
most imprudent exercise of an intermediate appellate court's 
"law-declaring" function. See State v. Grawien, 123 Wis.2d at 
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432, 367 N.W.2d at 818 (discussed in Part Cf supra m) . Finally, 
the Supreme Court has pending before it the question of Rule 
12(g) *s constitutionality* See State v. Babbell. Ut. Sup. Ct. 
No. 21033, Brief of Respondent at 23-42 (attached as Appendix E). 
POINT II 
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 
PLANTS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WERE 
MARIJUANA. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the plants seized from defendant's residence were marijuana. 
The trial court summarized the evidence presented in this regard 
and disposed of the issue in the memorandum decision attached as 
Appendix B. In addition to the case law cited by the court, its 
decision is consistent with the conclusions reached by numerous 
other courts addressing the same issue. E.g. In Re: Robert B., 
218 CaL,Rptr. 337, 342 (Cal. App. 1985); State v. Shelli, 675 
S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo.App. 1984); State v. Ennis. 334 N.W.2d 827, 833 
(N.D. 1983) (a case where the defendant had the same counsel and 
expert witness as defendant had in the instant case); State v. 
Choy, 661 P.2d 1206, 1212, n. 13 (Hawaii App. 1983); R.C.M. v. 
Stafcfi, 660 S.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Tex. App. 1983). It being the 
prerogative of the trier of fact to decide the weight and 
credibility to be given expert testimony, State v. Tanner, 675 
P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983), this Court should uphold the trial 
court's finding that the evidence substantially supported a 
conclusion that the plants seized were marijuana. See State v. 
&a£JS£JL* 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (setting forth the 
standards for reviewing sufficiency of evidence). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendants 
convictions should be affirmed. ^^_ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c^l day of April, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
*y6ai*JL vo.^3^ 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Ronald J. Yengich and Earl Xaiz, Attorneys for Appellant, 72
 //, 
East 400 South, Suite 355, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^X-T" 
day of April, 1987. 
a 
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T* L. "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
B. KENT MORGAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT ODUPT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v 
ALLEN B. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
Criminal No. CR 85-1582 
Hon. Judith Billings 
THE State of Utah, by and throuqh its Counsel, B. KENT MORGAN, Deputy 
County Attorney, and the Defendant, ALLEN MILLER, and his Counsel, MARC G. 
KURZMAN, ESQ., hereby consent, aqree, and stipulate to the following matters in 
the above-entitled case: 
1. Defendant expressly waives his right to a trial by jury in the 
above-entitled matter and requests that this case be heard before this Court as 
finder of fact and law on MAY 27, 1986, at 10:00 A.M. The State of Utah consents 
and has no objection to this matter being heard before this Court without a jury. 
2. Ttie State of Utah and the defendant, agree that the elements 
constituting the crime of Production of a Cbntrolled Substance in violation of 
Section 58-37-8(1)(a) d ) , Utah Code Ann., as charged in the Information on file 
in this case are as follows: 
STIPULATION 
Criminal No. CR 85-1582 
Page 2 
(1) That on or about the 1st day of August, 1985, in Salt Lake 
Oounty, the defendant, ALLEN BOYD MILLER did the following acts: 
(2) At the said time and place, the defendant produced, manufactured, 
or possessed with intent to produce or manufacture a substance; and 
(3) That such substance was then and there a controlled substance; 
to-wit: marijuana; and " 
(4) That said defendant did so intentionally and knowingly. 
3. The defendant stipulates to the existence of and concedes that the 
State has sufficient evidence to prove elements (1)(2) and (4) of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant has reveiwed the testimony and physical 
evidence provided in discovery and at the Motion to Suppress filed in this case 
and is satisfied that there is a basis in that evidence to knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to have the State meet its burden of producing 
evidence and persuading the trier of fact as to the existence of each of these 
elements. Ihe State of Utah proffers to the Court that evidence exists on 
each of the above elements and stipulates to a finding by the Court that elements 
(1), (2), and (4) exist. 
4. The Defendant expressly reserves his right to have the State 
produce evidence showing proof beyond a reasonable doubt that element (3) exists. 
5. Defendant agrees to provide handwriting exemplars to the State of 
Utah throuqh the County Attorney's Office and/or to its appointed agents. 
6. Defendant will refrain from offering, introducing, or referring 
to any evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, on botanical or agronomic 
varieties of the plant ccnronly known as "marijuana" through direct or cross-
examination of any witness in the course of the trial. 
STIPULATION 
Criminal No. CR 85-1582 
Page 3 
7, Notwithstanding the above stipulation, Defendant expressly re-
serves the right to examine any witness on matters that pertain to facts that 
establish whether the substance alleged in this case is a controlled substance 
within the definition of the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
EfcTED this / 0 ^ a y of (-^/yj/f'l^^ ^ 1986. 
T. L. "TEE 
Salt Lake bounty Attorney 
MARC G. KURZi 
Attorney for Defe 
APPENDIX B 
JUL 1 1936 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, S CASE NC>\ CR-85-1582 
vs. : 
ALAN B. MILLER, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Court without a jury on June 19, 1986. The State of Utah was 
represented by its counsel B. Kent Morgan, Deputy County Attorney, 
and the defendant by his counsel Mark G. Kurzman, Esq. and Ron 
Yengich, Esq. The sole issue presented to the Court for a factual 
determination was whether the State could prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the plants cultivated by Mr. Miller and seized by 
the State were marijuana. A formal stipulation was presented 
resolving all other issues before the Court, which was received 
as State's Exhibit 8. 
The defendant claims that the State has failed to meet 
its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance 
seized from the defendant was marijuana. Specifically, the 
defendant claims that the scientific tests performed by the 
State are screening tests rather than fingerprint or positive 
identification tests, and that these tests do not rule out the 
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possibility that the substance could be something other than 
marijuana. This Court is not persuaded by the defendants arguments 
as more fully explained herein. 
The test this Court must apply is a legal test, not a scientific 
test. The Court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the substance in question is marijuanA: This is not to 
be confused with a scientific test which may require that a 
scientist exclude every other possible substance before determining 
that the substance is "marijuana." To prove that the substance 
is legally marijuana the State need not eliminate every other 
possibility. 
The State called three witnesses during the course of the 
trial, who each expressed his opinion that the substance in 
issue was marijuana. 
The State9s first witness, agent Stewart Smith, testified 
that he was the agent in charge of the investigation, and observed 
over a period of time the method and circumstance of growth 
of the substance at issue. Furthermore, he personally observed 
the substance at the time it was seized. He testified that 
he noted numerous plants in various stages of growth and drying 
which were concealed in a residential home as illustrated by 
the photographs of the plants and gardening equipment in State1s 
Exhibits 1-5. Among the other objective circumstances observed 
at the Miller residence were dirt piled over basement windows, 
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large roof vents not visible from the street, and swamp coolers 
running into the basement. Furthermore, the garage door remained 
permanently closed and all windows to the basement were boarded. 
Upon entering the house, the agent testified that there was 
a strong smell which he had over the years in more than one 
thousand drug investigations been able to identify as the smell 
of marijuana. Upon entering the house, the agent further found 
trays filled with the beads from the marijuana plants stored 
in a separate locked bedroom. In total, the tools, growth pattern, 
and plants themselves indicated a large and sophisticated hydroponic 
cultivation of marijuana. 
The agent further testified that the plants had large leafy 
green leaves with serrated edges and odd numbered petals and 
based upon his experience it was marijuana. 
The State next called Kevin Smith, who analyzed the samples 
in the course of his employment as a criminologist at the State 
Crime Lab. The Court certified him as an expert based upon 
his education in the field of chemistry, and his training at 
the Utah State Crime Lab in identifying controlled substances. 
Mr. Smith has testified in numerous court proceedings identifying 
Barijuana. He testified that he followed the laboratory procedures 
for testing suspected controlled substances set by the State 
of Utah, which include the following: (1) he visually inspected 
the substance, and determined there were no signs of adulteration 
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present, and that the material inspected appeared to be a dried 
plant material consistent with a marijuana plant; (2) he weighed 
the material; (3) he inspected the material through a stereo-zoom 
microscope, and determined that the plant material had cystolithic 
hairs and fine hairs on opposite sides of the same leaf fragment 
consistent with the characteristics of marijuana leaves; and 
(4) he performed a modified Duquenois-Levine chemical color 
test, and observed a series of color changes confirming the 
presence of resins found in marijuana. 
The State on rebuttal buttressed Mr. Smith's scientific 
testimony by calling of Mr. Robert Brinkman, head of the State 
Criminal Lab who the Court further found an expert in identification 
of controlled substances. He stated that he was responsible 
for setting the procedure for testing marijuana at the crime 
lab, and that the procedure had been followed in this case. 
He further stated that he had independently analyzed the samples 
at issue in this proceeding, and that he had determined that 
each was marijuana. 
The defendant called Dr. Fullerton, an expert in the identi-
fication of marijuana. Although there were some differences 
in the testimony among the experts, the substance of the testimony 
was not in dispute. Dr. Fullertonfs point was that the microscopic 
exam and the Duquenois-Levine chemical color test were screening 
tests, and that the results were consistent with marijuana, 
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but that they did not eliminate all other possibilities. His 
position was that only if the State performed an infrared or 
mass spectography test could the State fingerprint the substance 
as marijuana, and thus prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the substance in question was marijuana. 
The defendant relies upon State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127 
(Minn. 1979) to support his position that the Duquenois-Levine 
test and the microscopic exam are not sufficient to identify 
the substance beyond a reasonable doubt as marijuana. However, 
even this case does not hold that these tests as a matter of 
law are insufficient to find the substance is marijuana beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Rather, the court states that these tests 
should be combined with objective circumstances that would buttress 
the conclusion that the substance was marijuana. In the Vail 
case, the court stated that the other facts relied upon by the 
trial court were insufficient proof, as each of those circumstances 
merely went to the defendants belief that the substance was 
marijuana. Our case is distinguishable, as all of the objective 
circumstances cited above are the actual observations of professional 
narcotics agents, and each is consistent only with the fact 
that the substance being grown was an illicit substance, i.e., 
marijuana. This Court agrees with the court in Turner v. State 
of Florida. 388 So.2d 254: 
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We expressly decline to follow the "Minnesota 
Rule" which requires scientific proof of 
the actual identification of the substance 
as marijuana. Instead, we approve the opinion 
in Moore v. United States. 374 A.2d 299, 
302 (App. D.C. 1977) stating that in addition 
to the scientific tests other facts tending 
to show the identity of the substance, such 
as its appearance and smell, and circumstances 
under which it was seized are probative 
and can meet the state's burden of proof. 
Id. at 257. 
The Court's holding that the scientific tests performed 
in this case, buttressed by other objective evidence persuades 
the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance in question 
is marijuana is consistent with many other similar cases. See, 
People v. Jackson. 134 111.App.3d 785 (1985), State v. Williams, 
471 So.2d 255 (La. App. 1985), and Turner v. State, 388 So.2d 
254 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
Based upon the stipulation received, and the finding of 
the Court that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the substance seized from the defendant was marijuana, the Court 
finds the defendant guilty of production of a controlled substance, 
a Third Degree Felony. The Court requests counsel for the State 
of Utah to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based 
upon the Court's Memorandum Decision and to submit them to the 
Court within ten (10) days. The Court further orders that counsel 
for the defendant inform the Court if the defendant wishes a 
,W 
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presentence evaluation performed and sets sentencing for August 
1, 1986 at 8:30 a.m. 
Dated this 1st dav of July, 1986. 
2 c *mL/n. #//,? / 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DtXON HWOLfY 
L . ^ * * 1 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this / dav of July, 1986: 
B. Kent Morgan 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark G. Xurzman 
Ronald J. Yengich 
Attorneys for Defendant 
72 East 400 South #355 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLEN BOYD MILLER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. CR-85-1582 
Defendants Motion to Suppress came before the Court on 
February 6, 1986 at 9:00 a.m. The defendant was represented 
by Stephen R. McCaughey, Esq., and the State was represented 
by B. Kent Morgan, Esq. The Court, having received oral and 
documentary evidence, took the matter under advisement to review 
the authorities submitted, and is now prepared to enter its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as incorporated in this 
Memorandum Decision. 
FACTS 
The defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained in a 
search conducted on August 1, 1985, by Officer Stewart Smith, 
a state narcotics officer, and officers from a variety of other 
law enforcement agencies. The subject of the search was defendant's 
residence located at 7889 South 3850 West, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. A search warrant was issued upon Judge Michael Hutchings9 
determination that an affidavit provided by Officer Smith which 
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included several attachments and photographs set forth probable 
cause for a search of the residence. Officer Smithfs affidavit 
summarized the findings of a detailed investigation that had 
been conducted by Officer Smith and others for approximately 
a month and one-half* 
The affidavit pointed out numerous factors that led Officer 
Smith, a trained narcotics officer with extensive experience, 
to believe that the residence was being used as a cultivation 
center for the mass production of marijuana, mushrooms, or some 
other unlawful substance. Among the factors supporting this 
belief was information regarding the physical appearance of 
the residence, namely, that the roof of the residence had two 
large vents, which were visible only from the back of the house, 
and had been painted the same color as the roof; two swamp coolers 
had been vented into the basement of the residence through basement 
window wells; the basement windows had been boarded closed and 
dirt bermed around them; several grow lights were stacked near 
the coolers; when the side door of the garage was opened, a 
large furnace-like apparatus with two smokestacks was visible; 
the garage windows had been boarded closed in the same manner 
as the basement windows; the back yard contained three large 
steel gardening sheds; and the residence had three electrical 
power boxes. 
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The above information was gathered through actual observations 
of the police officers involved in the investigation. This 
investigation was begun pursuant to a complaint by neighbors 
in the area who reported that vehicles stopped for brief periods 
at the residence in the early morning hours, and that a large 
U-Haul truck was loaded and unloaded through the side door of 
the garage, which is not visible from the street. These reports 
from neighbors led Officer Smith to conduct observations of 
the residence, and to further investigate the information observed. 
The observations of the police officers corroborated the 
reports of the neighbors and led Officer Smith, prompted by 
his narcotics training and experience, to investigate the Utah 
Power & Light records for the Miller residence. These records 
were submitted with the affidavit to Judge Hutchings. The power 
consumption for the residence was four to five times in excess 
of the normal use for a home of the size of the Miller residence. 
Further, Utah Power & Light told Officer Smith that Miller denied 
meter readers access to his property, but paid his bills without 
complaint, although they were sometimes in excess of $2,000.00 
a month 
The affidavit also included information from a credit check 
indicating that Miller was self-employed by Miller1* Auto Body 
Shop which, after a search of business licenses, appeared not 
to exist. 
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In addition to the information in the affidavit suggesting 
a sophisticated cultivation operation, the affidavit provided 
to Judge Hutchings contained information regarding drug-related 
criminal involvement of Miller and two other individuals believed 
to have frequented the residence. The affidavit stated that 
Mr. Miller had previously been arrested for possession of marijuana 
and psilocybin mushrooms, and mentioned that Franklin David 
Spain, who used the Miller residence as his address, had been 
arrested in the last year for possession of marijuana. The 
Kane County Sheriff's records indicated that Miller had been 
arrested on a DUI/Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance 
charge, and that Franklin David Spain was present in the vehicle 
at the time. The police report indicates that marijuana, marijuana 
seeds, and "what appears to be mushrooms" were involved. The 
report further shows Franklin David Spain as listing his address 
as being 7889 South 3850 West, Salt Lake County, Utah, which 
address was the subject of the search in question here. The 
attachments to the affidavit which were considered by Judge 
Hutchings stated that the police officers had observed an automobile 
owned by one Vann Larson, ••a known drug user," coming and going 
from the premises in the sarly morning hours, staying only a 
short time before leaving. 
Officer Smith's affidavit provided to Judge Hutchings a 
statement that he believed that the Miller residence was being 
STATE V. MILLER PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
used for cultivation of marijuana or mushrooms. The affidavit 
detailed the connection between the information contained in 
the affidavit and Officer Smiths conclusion that the residence 
was being used for an unlawful purpose. Based upon Officer 
Smith1s affidavit and the numerous exhibits and photographs 
attached thereto which had been compiled through the one and 
one-half month investigation, Judge Hutchings issued a Mno knock11 
warrant specifically describing in detail the residence to be 
searched, and items which were to be the subject of that search. 
PPJNJON 
I. Probable Cause 
Probable cause exists "when the facts and circumstances 
within [the officerfs] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information. . . [are] sufficient in themselves 
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that. . . an 
offense had been or is being committed.11 prinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), (citing Carrol v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
This Court finds that the standard in determining whether 
or not a search warrant is sufficient to establish probable 
cause is the "totality of the circumstances" standard as set 
forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See, State 
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985). This Court will 
not rigidly apply the test laid down in Aauilar v. Texas. 378 
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U.S. 108 (1964), and in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969), but will apply a more common sense approach in determining 
the sufficiency of a search warrant. In State v. Anderson. 
701 P. 2d 1099 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court pointed out 
that the United States Supreme Court had abandoned the ••rigid 
Aauilar-Spinelli test" and stated that: 
In doing BO, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the more flexible "totality of the circumstances" 
standard. More recently, in Massachusetts 
v. Upton, the Supreme Court specifically 
reiterated that it had not merely refined 
or qualified the Aauilar-SpineHi test, 
but had "rejected it as hypertechnical and 
divorced from reality." 
Id. at 1101 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). 
The Utah court, however, did indicate that in certain cases 
the "Acruilar-Spinelli" test "might" be used as a guide in determining 
the sufficiency of a search warrant. These guidelines suggest 
that affidavits based upon informant's tips should include infor-
mation sufficient to "(1) reveal the basis of an informant's 
knowledge, and (2) establish the veracity of the informant or, 
alternatively, the reliability of his report in a particular 
case." IdU. at 1101. 
The defendant claims that the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the search warrant in question should be suppressed due to 
a lack of reliability of the neighbors submitting the complaint, 
and other information to the police. It is important to point 
out at the onset, that the affidavit and attachments submitted 
STATE V. MILLER PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to Judge Hutchings were largely based upon the officer's own 
independent observations and investigations. Although the neighbor's 
complaint prompted the officer's investigations, the affidavit 
itself vas based substantially upon the officer's investigations, 
rather than upon the neighbors' statements to the police. Further-
more, the informant in this case was a neighbor of the suspect, 
as opposed to the type of individual normally contemplated as 
an "informant" who is himself involved in criminal activity, 
and whose reliability is necessarily questioned. £f., State 
v. Treadwav, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (1972). The 
fact that the neighbor giving the information in this case was 
not the traditional type of "informant" whose reliability must 
be questioned, mitigates the problem of reliability complained 
of by the defendant. 
Furthermore, all of the information given by the neighbor 
in this case was subsequently observed firsthand, and corroborated 
by the officers, and was documented with police reports, business 
records, photographs, etc. Additionally, the officer's investigation 
yielded information substantially beyond that given by the neighbor. 
The information given by the neighbor only indicated suspicious 
activity at the residence and the officers, in response, investi-
gated further to determine if the information was such that 
further investigations or searches were warranted. The neighbor's 
information did not include information that drugs or other 
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illegal conduct were involved, only that the neighbor had observed 
suspicious activities. 
The defendant further complains that the activity and infor-
mation set forth in the affidavit suggesting a large cultivation 
operation is equally consistent with lawful, activity. See, 
People v. Remers. 470 P.2d 11 (1970). The defendant, however, 
offered no evidence whatsoever as to what that equally consistent 
lawful conduct would be. Furthermore, Officer Smith, a narcotics 
officer with extensive training and experience in narcotics 
investigations, swore in his affidavit that it was his opinion 
that there was a drug operation on the premises. This information, 
along with the drug-related criminal records of the three individuals 
which the police reasonably believed frequented the subject 
location, the suspicious activity occurring at odd hours, and 
the scarcity of a lawful explanation could reasonably lead the 
investigating officers to believe that it was more likely than 
not that there were illegal and drug-related operations on the 
premises. 
II. Alleged misstatements in the Affidavit 
The defendant further argues that the affidavit contains 
false statements made knowingly or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth. This Court agrees with defendants assertion 
that if a false statement, made knowingly or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, was included in an affidavit for a search warrant, 
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and was necessary for a finding of probable cause, then the 
Motion to Suppress must be granted. Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978). The defendant, however, has offered no evidence 
that any of the officers knowingly, or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth included any allegedly false information in the 
affidavit. Even if information included in* the affidavit is 
false, there is absolutely no evidence suggesting that such 
information was included knowingly or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that 
all of the alleged misstatements complained of by the defendant 
were based upon reasonably reliable information such as official 
public documents, business records, police reports, and conversations 
with sheriffs previously involved with the suspect. 
The defendant complains that the following statement included 
in the affidavit is false and misleading: 
A traffic survey of the area identified 
several cars for which ownership records 
identified a known drug user coming and 
going from the premises in the early morning 
hours. These vehicles stay only a short 
time, and then leave. 
The defendant argues that the statement is false, and that 
the charges against the owner of one of the cars identified 
as a "known drug user" had been dismissed, and that the statement 
implies that several cars were identified as belonging to known 
drug users. Although inartfully phrased, this Court will not 
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hold an officer to be held to a standard of perfection in his 
wording of affidavits. A careful reading of the statement shows 
that several cars were observed, and pne of the cars belonged 
to a known drug user. The argument that the statement is false 
because the charges against the owner of that one car were dropped 
is unpersuasive, inasmuch as this Court does not believe that 
a person must be convicted of a drug-related offense before 
he can be known to the police as a drug user. 
Another misstatement alleged by the defendant are the statements 
in the affidavit concerning the drug charges against Miller 
and Spain. The defendant contends that Miller was not arrested 
for possession of psilocybin mushrooms and marijuana as indicated 
in the affidavit, and that any drug-related charges against 
Miller were subsequently dismissed. The evidence, however, 
clearly shows that this statement was based upon the relevant 
police records and conversations with the sheriff involved, 
which clearly indicated that Miller had been arrested and charged 
with possession of a controlled substance, and that the arrest 
involved marijuana and "what appeared to be mushrooms." The 
fact that the possession charge was subsequently dismissed is 
irrelevant, inasmuch as the statement in the affidavit contains 
no information as to the disposition of the charge, and such 
disposition was unknown to the officers at the time of the search. 
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Finally, defendant argues that the affidavit contained 
a false statement concerning the address of Franklin David Spain 
as being that of the residence which was searched. This information 
in the affidavit, however, was based upon information given 
by Spain himself to the Kane County Sheriff indicating that 
his residence was, in fact, the address whioh was the subject 
of this search. Furthermore, neighbors in the area had reported 
seeing Spain at the residence in question. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant is correct in his 
argument that misstatements were knowingly or recklessly included 
in the affidavit, even without these alleged misstatements, 
the affidavit included information concerning the intensive 
cultivation operations, drug-related criminal activity on the 
part of at least one individual reasonably believed to frequent 
the premises, and the opinion of a narcotics officer with extensive 
training and experience in such investigations. This information, 
independent of the alleged misstatements, is sufficient to establish 
probable cause for a warrant to issue. Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
lilt No-EnocK Wprrgnt 
The defendant also contends that the warrant was improperly 
Issued inasmuch as it was a "no knock99 search warrant. The 
granting of the "no knock99 provision in the warrant issued by 
Judge Hutchings, was based upon Judge Hutchings9 legal determination 
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that such a provision was proper. The defendant offered no 
•vidence of any kind suggesting that there was any reason why 
the searching officers could not reasonably and in good faith 
rely upon Judge Hutchings1 determination that a "no knock11 warrant 
was proper. In view of the lack of such evidence, the Motion 
to Suppress on this ground cannot be granted. United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 82 (1984). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that the affidavit behind the warrant contained 
sufficient information to establish probable cause for the search. 
This is true even if the misstatements alleged by defendant 
are removed from consideration. Furthermore, the officers involved 
acted in good faith in acting and relying upon the no knock 
provision determined by Judge Hutchings to be legally proper. 
Based upon the above, the defendant's Motion to Suppress 
is hereby denied. 
The Court orders counsel for the State to prepare an Order 
in conformance with this Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
Dated this 10th day of February, 1986. 
fltffflTHTMT BILLINGS Tp 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE KJ 
ATTEST 
H. D4XOM HIKXEV 
V D***y 0*J** 
STATE V. MILLER PAGE THIRTEEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this '^ day of February, 1986: 
B. Kent Morgan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen R. McCaughey 
Attorney for Defendant 
72 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^yQ-i^rUf 
APPENDIX D 
• I. *TED" CASSOS 
ounty Attorney 
y: KIChAEL J. CHRISTENSES 
eputy County Attorney 
ourtside Office Building 
31 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
hone: (601) 363-7900 
IS THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTKEST 
IS ASD FOR SALT LAKE COUSTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TATE OF UTAH ) 
) : SS 
ojr.zy of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
EFORE: 450 South 200 East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
he undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
hat he has reason to believe 
hat (X) on the premises known as 7889 South 3850 West, West Jordan, Utah 
n the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now 
ertain property or evidence described as: 
arijuana plants and/or mushrooms in various stages of cultivation, grow lights, 
ultivating paraphernalia, packaging materials, ledgers, crying equipment, seeds, 
otting soil and containers and bank receipts 
no that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
ffiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the 
rime(s) of Cultivation and Possession of Controlled Substance. 
Q) • -rv^jujb^ a% 
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AririAwr «>* SEARCH WUUUOT ^ ^ ^ * ^ _ b 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: ^ , . < 
On June 14, 198S, upon receipt of complaints of unusual traffic in the 
neighborhood of suspect premises by neighbors, affiant and other mernbers 
of the State of VUth Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement began i n v e s t i -
gat ion and surveillance of said suspect premises. In plain view observation 
of premises affiant observed and photographed the residence showing three 
large steel storage sheds to rear; two swar.p coolers that blow continually 
and empty into boarded up and bermed basement area; a furnace like 
apparatus with two large vent stacks are seen in garage area where windows 
are also boarded up, but are visible from roof line and when side door 
is open; a series of lights commonly used for crow lights were observed 
and photographed on swamp cooler; and neighbors have observed occupants 
of residence mixing up peat moss although the yard hits never been cared 
for or cultivated in any fashion. A traffic survey of the area identified 
several cars for which ownership records identified a known drug user 
coming And going from the premises in the early morning hours. These 
vehicles stay onlu a short time then leave. 
On numerous occasions a U-Haul truck has been located to the rear of 
the garage and neighbors have heard loading and unloading from the side 
door which is not as readily observable as the front garage door. This 
loading seems to occur at odd hours late at night. Neighbors have never 
seen the large garage door open. Neighbors reported seeing two large 
dogs with occupants when they were mixing peat moss, but most of the 
time the dogs remain inside. 
Contact with Utah Power and Light showed service lines coming into the 
home three times larger than required of that size residence. Monthly 
power consumption four to five times in excess of normal, with one bill 
for $2,Y00.00 Jrwhich suspect paid when meter reader came to read the meter. 
Utah Power and Light has been denied access to meter by Miller and has 
paid any bill without contest. The suspect, Allen B. Miller has prior 
illegal possession charges for possession of psilacybin mushrooms, 1/4 
pound and possession of marijuana. Franklin David Spain of the same 
address has also been arrested for possession of marijuana in the last 
year. Miller according to neighbors acts very secretive when observed 
around premises. 
Affiant, a trained narcotics officer knows that peat moss is used for 
growing marijuana and mushrooms and has observed numerous s tacks of 
plastic buckets at the residence, knows that furnaces can be used to 
dry plants for useage, and that swamp coolers can vent and humify plants 
being grown in a basement as at suspect premises. Large electrical 
consumption would be used to facilitate grow lights and drying equipment; 
and the truck used to load shipments for periodic distribution or final 
cultivation of plants at another growing site. Credit report Bhows 
suspect Miller self-employed with Miller's autobody shop which does not 
Beem to exist. Suspect truck observed at residence never has tools 
in i t . Surveillance termination 1200 hours, August 1, 1985. 
PACE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential 
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an unnamed 
source). Neighbors are private citizens whose reports have been observed 
and verified by affiant and photographed. Photographs are presented to 
magistrate as part of probable cause statement. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential 
informant to be correct and accurate through the following idenpendent 
investigation: continuous surveillance from June 14, 19S5 to August 1, 
19BB in which traffic survey and photographic surveillance, and background 
investigations confirmed neighbor's reports. 
WHEREFORE: the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to believe 
it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, dair&ged, or altered, or for other 
good reasons, to-wit: 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing the 
requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's authority 
or purpose because: 
(X) physical harm may result to any person if notice were given; 
or 
(x) the property sought ray be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Two large watch dogs are always present and might pose a hazard to 
Arresting officers. 
AFTXZXT " ~ T 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORH TO BEFORE ME this / day of August, 19BB. 
IJJFTri CIRCUITKOURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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B. Rule 1 2 ( g ) . Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As part of h i s argument on appeal, defendant contends 
that the evidence he chal lenges should have been excluded under 
Dtah R. Crim P, 12(g)* 8 Although defendant does not challenge 
the appropriateness or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Rule 12 (g ) , given 
that t h i s Court has never f u l l y discussed the rule , the State 
w i l l f i r s t examine the current s ta tus of t h i s modified 
exclusionary rule in Utah's criminal j u s t i c e system* The 
quest ion of whether exc lus ion was required under Rule 12(g) w i l l 
then te gdfoesggfl. 
8
 Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence or 
the suppression of evidence pursuant t o t h i s sec t ion or at t r i a l , 
upon grounds of unlawful search and se i zure , the suppression of 
evidence shal l not be granted unless the court f inds the 
v i o l a t i o n upon which i t i s based t o be both a substant ial 
v i o l a t i o n and not committed in good f a i t h . The court shal l s e t 
forth i t s reasons for such f inding . 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shal l in a l l cases be deemed 
substant ia l i f one or more of the fol lowing i s e s tab l i shed by the 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The v i o l a t i o n was gross ly neg l igent , w i l l f u l , mal ic ious , 
shocking t o the conscience of the court or was a resu l t of the 
pract ice of the law enforcement agency pursuant t o a general 
order of that agency; 
( i i ) The v i o l a t i o n was intended only to harass without 
l e g i t i m a t e law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace o f f i cer was act ing in good 
f a i t h under t h i s s e c t i o n , the court sha l l consider, in addit ion 
to any other relevant f a c t o r s , some or a l l of the fo l lowing: 
( i ) The extent of deviat ion from l e g a l search and seizure 
standards; 
( i i ) The extent to which exclusion w i l l tend t o deter future 
v i o l a t i o n s of search and seizure standards; 
( i i i ) Whether or not the o f f i cer was proceeding by way of a 
search warrant, arrest warrant, or re ly ing on previous s p e c i f i c 
d i r e c t i o n s of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
( iv ) The extent t o which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant e s t a b l i s h e s that the search 
or se izure was unlawful and substant ia l by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the peace o f f i cer or governmental agency roust then, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good f a i t h ac t ions of 
the peace o i f i c e r . 
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At the outse t , i t i s necessary to summarize the 
l e g i s l a t i v e h i s tory of Rule 12(g) and t h i s Court's treatment of 
i t in the case law. In 1982, the l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Rule 12(g) 
as part of the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act (1982 Utah Laws 
ch. 1 0 , SS 1 - 1 6 ) . During the time that Rule 12(g) operated as a 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rule of criminal procedure, t h i s Court 
never ruled upon i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . See State v . Anderson, 
701 P.2d at 1103. In September 1985, the Court in In Re: Rules 
of Procedure, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1985) , adopted a l l e x i s t i n g 
s tatutory r u l e s of procedure not i n c o n s i s t e n t with procedural 
r u l e s previously adopted by the Court. This adminis trat ive 
rul ing was made in response t o the amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII , 
s e c t i o n 4 of the Utah Const i tut ion 9 which were approved by the 
v o t e r s in November 1984 and became e f f e c t i v e on July 1 , 1985. 
See Compiler f s Notes, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, Replacement Vol . 1A at 
58 (Supp. 1986) . The amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the Court's rule-making author i ty , which had 
previously only been accorded by s t a t u t e . See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-4 (1977) (amended 1986); 1943 Utah Laws ch. 3 3 , S 1 (which 
gave the Court rule-making power in a l l c i v i l a c t i o n s ) . Since 
rece iv ing f u l l rule-making power in 1943, the Court apparently 
9
 A r t i c l e VIII , s e c t i o n 4 now provides in pert inent part: 
The supreme court shal l adopt ru l e s of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the s t a t e 
and shal l by rule manage the appel late process . The 
l e g i s l a t u r e may amend the ru les of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of a l l members of both houses of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . . . . 
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has never independently devised and adopted rules of criminal 
procedure; the l e g i s l a t u r e has h i s t o r i c a l l y performed t h i s task. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. S 105-1-1 £ t £££• (1943); UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-
1-1 £fc ££fl« (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-1 ££ ££fl. (1978); UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 77-35-1 $£ ££a. (1982) .1° This has not been the case 
with the ru le s of c i v i l procedure or the ru le s of evidence. See 
State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1332-33 (Utah 1986); Brickyard 
BQmg9vnerg, Ass fnt y t Gifrtons Realty; 668 p.2d 535, 539 (Utah 
1983) . In Re; Rules of Procedure marks the f i r s t time that the 
Court has independently adopted rules of criminal procedure; and 
i t did so through an apparent wholesale adoption of the 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rules contained in UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-1 
e t seq . (1982). There being no previously Court-adopted ru les of 
criminal procedure, the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s ru les presumably are now 
the Court's ru les—unqual i f i ed . Therefore, the S ta te i s 
proceeding on the assumption that Rule 12(g) i s in place as a 
rule of criminal procedure formally adopted by t h i s Court, and 
that i t i s the contro l l ing rule for a l l motions t o suppress 
evidence for an a l l eged ly unlawful search or s e i z u r e , gee State 
v . Hyqhf 711 P.2d at 273 (Zimmerman, J . , concurring separately) 
("I have found no case in which t h i s Court has decided t o adopt 
the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the quest ion 
of what remedy i s ava i lab le for an unlawful search or seizure 
1 0
 In 1980, the l e g i s l a t u r e , for the f i r s t t ime, s p e c i f i c a l l y 
designated the ru le s of criminal procedure and s e t them apart in 
chapter 35 of t i t l e 77 . 
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under our s t a t e cons t i tu t ion*) A* 
Having said t h i s , two i s s u e s require t h i s Court1s 
cons iderat ion: (1) To what extent i s the t rad i t i ona l 
exclusionary rule required under the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n or the 
s t a t e cons t i tu t ion? (2) I s Rule 1 2 ( g ) , the Court's ru le f a 
permiss ible remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of the accused's r ights under 
the fourth amendment and a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14? These i s s u e s are 
raised by the State because t h i s Court has never f u l l y d iscussed 
i t s ra t iona le for applying an exclusionary rule for unlawful 
searches and se i zures in cases prior t o i t s adoption of Rule 
12(g) , or d i sc losed i t s ra t iona le for adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which 
represents a clear departure from the exclusionary rule the Court 
has t r a d i t i o n a l l y appl ied. The S ta te simply o f f er s the fo l lowing 
a n a l y s i s as support for the Court's adoption of Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
The S t a t e ' s approach to these i s s u e s w i l l not be an 
or ig ina l one. Four helpful law review a r t i c l e s on the 
exclusionary rule w i l l be r e l i e d upon in developing the 
d i scuss ion that fol lows—Coe, "The ALI S u b s t a n t i a l i t y Tes t : A 
F l ex ib l e Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction," 10 Ga. L. Rev. 1 
(1975); Kaplan, "The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule," 26 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1027 (1974); Schroeder, "Deterring Fourth Amendment 
V i o l a t i o n s : Al ternat ives t o the Exclusionary Rule," 69 Geo. L.J. 
1361 (1981); and Stewart, "The Road t o Mapp v . Ohio and Beyond: 
The Origins , Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases ," 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1983) . The 
H Jus t i ce Zimmerman's concurrence was i ssued prior to the 
issuance of In Re: Rules of Procedure. 
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focus here w i l l be s l i g h t l y d i f ferent from that in other b r i e f s 
on the subject recent ly f i l e d by the S ta te in S ta te v. Mendoza, 
Case No. 20922
 f a case currently pending before the Court. 
Although the Mendoza br i e f s provide a good s tar t ing point for a 
d i scuss ion of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , they do not address pertinent quest ions 
regarding the neces s i ty of an exclusionary rule under our s ta te 
const i tut ion* Accordingly, the State urges the Court to consider 
the S t a t e ' s arguments in Mendoza in l i g h t of the d iscuss ion of 
Rule 12(g) presented here. 
Three Supreme Court cases are general ly credited with 
producing the exclusionary rule—poyd v. United States# 116 U.S. 
616 (1886); Adams v . New York. 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Weeks v. 
United S t a t e s . 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The f a i r l y narrow rule that 
emerged from that t r i l o g y of cases was s i g n i f i c a n t l y broadened in 
subsequent cases , culminating in Agnello v. United S t a t e s , 269 
U.S. 20 (1925), which held that contraband se i zed in v i o l a t i o n of 
the fourth amendment could not be used as evidence in a federal 
criminal t r i a l . However, none of the Court's opinions c l ear ly 
i d e n t i f i e d the doctrinal bas i s for the exclusionary ru le . Then 
in Wolf v, Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) , the Court made clear 
that the secur i ty of one f s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the po l ice i s " impl ic i t in the concept of ordered l i b e r t y , " and 
therefore enforceable against the s t a t e s through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although i t for the f i r s t 
time e x p l i c i t l y treated the quest ion of the exc lus ion of 
i l l e g d i l y se i zed evidence as a matter of remedies, apart from the 
right secured by the fourth amendment, the Court in Wolf refused 
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t o impose the f edera l ly fashioned exclusionary rule on the s t a t e s 
as the part icular remedy for uncons t i tu t iona l ly se i zed evidence. 
The HjCLLf majority recognized that other "equally e f f e c t i v e " s t a t e 
methods for deterring unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s would 
s u f f i c e . 338 U.S. at 3 1 . 
Howeverf in 1961 the Court in Mapp v . Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) , overruled the pert inent port ions of Wolf and held 
that the exclusionary rule was appl icable to s t a t e criminal 
prosecut ions: 
Today we once again examine Wolf1 s c o n s t i t u -
t iona l documentation of the right to privacy 
from unreasonable s t a t e in trus ion , and, 
af ter i t s dozen years on our books, are l ed 
by i t t o c lose the only courtroom door re -
maining open t o evidence secured by o f f i c i a l 
l awlessness in f lagrant abuse of that bas ic 
r ight , reserved t o a l l persons as a s p e c i f i c 
guarantee against that very same unlawful 
conduct. We hold that a l l evidence obtained 
by searches and s e i z u r e s in v i o l a t i o n of the 
Const i tut ion i s , by that same author i ty , 
inadmiss ible in a s t a t e court. 
367 U.S. at 654-55. F ina l l y , in a recent dec i s ion the Court 
c l e a r l y rejected the premise upon which Mapp seemed t o res t— 
i . e . , that the exclusionary rule was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required 
remedy. In United S t a t e s v . Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) , i t 
s t a t e d : 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provis ion 
express ly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in v i o l a t i o n of i t s commands, and 
an examination of i t s or ig in and purposes 
makes c lear that the use of f r u i t s of a 
past unlawful search or se izure "work Is] no 
new Fourth Amendment wrong." United S t a t e s 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 354 (1974). The 
wrong condemned by the Amendment i s "ful ly 
accomplished" by the unlawful search or 
se izure i t s e l f , ib id .# and the exclusionary 
ru le i s nei ther intended nor able to "cure 
28-
the invasion of the defendant 's r i gh t s which 
he has already suffered." Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 540 (WHITE, J . , d i s sen t ing ) . The 
ru le thus operates as *a j ud i c i a l l y created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
r ights generally through i t s deter rent e f fec t , 
rather than a personal cons t i tu t ional r ight 
pf the person Aggrieved," United States Vt 
Calandra, supra, a t 348. 
468 U.S. at 906 (emphasis added). Thus, now that i t i s s e t t l ed 
tha t the exclusionary ru le i s not required by the federal 
cons t i tu t ion , the immediate question confronting s t a t e appel la te 
courts i s whether the ru le i s required by t he i r individual s t a t e 
cons t i t u t i ons . 
As with the fourth amendment, a r t i c l e I , section 14 
contains no provision expressly excluding from a criminal t r i a l 
evidence tha t has been obtained in v io la t ion of i t s commands. 
Prior t o the Supreme Court 's decision in Mapp, which extended the 
federal exclusionary rule to s t a t e criminal prosecutions, t h i s 
Court, after a de ta i led ana lys i s of the quest ion, expressly held 
t h a t evidence should not be excluded even though i t was obtained 
as a r e su l t of an i l l e g a l search and se izure . S ta te v. Aime, 62 
Utah 476, 478-d5, 220 P. 704, 705-08 (1923). See also State v. 
Fa i r . 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P.2d 615 (1960). This posi t ion was in 
l ine with the majority view held by s t a t e courts a t tha t time. 
Aime, 62 Utah a t 480-81, 220 P. a t 706. I t was not u n t i l Mapp 
had been decided tha t the Court recognized exclusion as the 
remedy for a v io la t ion of the fourth amendment or a r t i c l e I , 
sect ion 14. State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 66, 387 P.2d 240, 
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241-42 (1963) , ygcfltefl QT\ Other qrgfflflfff 379 U.S. 1 (1964) .12 
Since Louden, the Court has f a i t h f u l l y appl ied the f e d e r a l l y 
fashioned exclusionary rule in criminal c a s e s . E.g. State v . 
fiallSLa&S, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985); S ta te v. Harr is . 671 P.2d 175 
(Otah 1983) . However, the Supreme Court's s i g n i f i c a n t 
modif icat ion of that ru le in Leon, coupled with i t s c lear 
statement there that the rule i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required, 
g ive s t h i s Court every reason t o f u l l y d i scuss the neces s i ty of 
an exclusionary rule under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n and t o explain 
why the recent ly adopted Rule 12(g) i s an appropriate r u l e . 
Three major ra t iona le s for the exclusionary rule in 
search-and-seizure cases have developed in the case law and l e g a l 
l i t e r a t u r e : (1) the remedial or personal r ight r a t i o n a l e ; (2) 
the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y r a t i o n a l e ; and (3) the deterrence 
r a t i o n a l e . Coe, supra at 14 -24 . Although a lengthy d i scuss ion 
of each of these r a t i o n a l e s i s not p o s s i b l e here , some a t t e n t i o n 
should be given them so that a foundation may be l a i d for a 
meaningful a n a l y s i s of Rule 12(g)—a rule which r e t a i n s exc lus ion 
as a remedy where the search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n i s both 
subs tant ia l and not committed in good f a i t h . See Rule 1 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) . 
*
2
 Louden could be read as adopting the exclusionary rule as the 
s o l e remedy for an unlawful search or se izure under the s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . However, by simply c i t i n g t o Mapp. the Court 
appears t o have lumped the s t a t e and federal provis ions together 
without g iv ing much thought to the independent s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ques t ion . Therefore, the State b e l i e v e s that 
J u s t i c e Zimmerman was correct in Hygh when he observed that there 
appeared to be "no case in which t h i s Court ha[d] decided t o 
adopt the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the 
quest ion of what remedy i s ava i lab le for unlawful search or 
se i zure under our State Cons t i tu t ion ." 711 P.2d at 273 . 
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The remedial or personal right ra t iona le embraces the 
notion that the exc lus ion of evidence i s a right inherent in the 
personal cons t i tu t iona l right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures* However, despite some degree of support, 
the remedial or compensatory j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary 
r u l e has generally been rejected. Coe, suvra at 1 5 ; Schroeder, 
supra at 1426. £ut £££ State v. Johnson. 716 P.2d at 1297 n. 11; 
S ta te v, Grawein, 123 Wis.2d 428, 431-32, 367 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 
(Wis. App. 1985) ( c i t i n g Sta te v . Kreiobaum, 194 Wis. 229, 232 , 
215 N.W. 896, 897-98 (1927)) ; S ta te v. White, 97 Wash.2d 92, 110, 
640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982) . A frequently c i t ed flaw in t h i s 
theory i s that the t e x t of the fourth amendment does not d i r e c t l y 
require exc lus ion; nor i s there anything in the events giving 
r i s e t o the adoption of the fourth amendment that supports the 
view that i t was intended t o require exc lus ion . Stewart, supra 
at 1381. As noted e a r l i e r , the Supreme Court c l ear ly re jected 
t h i s theory in Leon» 468 U.S. at 906. Because a r t i c l e I , sec t ion 
14, l i k e the fourth amendment, contains no textual requirement 
for exclus ion and there appears t o be nothing in the his tory of 
i t s adoption t o ind icate that exc lus ion of evidence would be 
required for a v i o l a t i o n of the provis ion, t h i s Court should 
again r e j e c t the remedial or personal right rat ionale as a 
cons t i tu t iona l bas i s for the exclusionary rule , as i t did, for 
a l l pract ica l purposes, in Aime, 62 Utah at 480-85, 220 P. 706-
08 . 
The theory that exclus ion i s necessary to preserve 
j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y has a l so received much c r i t i c i s m and has 
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generally played only a minor ro le in the development of the 
exclusionary r u l e . Coe, supra a t 17. The notion underlying t h i s 
theory was perhaps best a r t i c u l a t e d in the dissent of Ju s t i ce 
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United S t a t e s , 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J . , d i s sen t ing ) : 
Our Government i s the potent , the omnipresent 
teacher . For good or for i l l , i t teaches the 
whole people by i t s example. . . . If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, i t breeds 
contempt for law; i t i nv i t e s every man t o 
become a law unto himself; i t i n v i t e s anarchy. 
In t h a t same case, Jus t ice Holmes wrote in h i s dissent ing 
opinion: 
We have to choose, and for my par t I think 
i t l e s s evi l that some criminals should 
escape than t h a t the Government should play 
an ignoble pa r t . 
277 U.S. a t 470. 
Although some courts continue to recognize the j ud i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y r a t iona le as the most compelling j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
exclusionary ru le , see , e .g . . State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. 
Super, a t 244, 491 A.2d a t 45, i t i s subject t o the same a t tack 
as i s the personal r ight r a t i o n a l e — i . e . , there appears t o be no 
cons t i tu t iona l bas is for i t , e i ther t ex tua l ly or h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
Stewart, supra at 1383. Hi s to r i ca l ly , courts have in a var ie ty 
of circumstances admitted i l l e g a l l y obtained evidence, apparently 
not overly concerned t h a t to do so would necessar i ly involve the 
court in ' d i r t y bus iness ." I M J 3 . ; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
486 (1976) (observing t h a t the fourth amendment "has never been 
in te rpre ted to proscribe the in t roduct ion of i l l e g a l l y seized 
evidence in a l l proceedings or against a l l persons") ; Coe, supra 
at 17 . This c r i t i c i s m appears sound, and although there i s a 
good deal of merit t o the value judgment inherent in the j u d i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y doctr ine , i t does not provide a sound const i tu t iona l 
bas i s for the exclusionary r u l e . Indeed, the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y 
r a t i o n a l e was e x p l i c i t l y rejected as an independent 
cons t i tu t iona l bas i s for the exclusionary rule by the Supreme 
Court in Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433 , 450 n. 25 (1974) . The 
t e x t and his tory of a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 demand no d i f f erent 
conclusion by t h i s Court. 
The deterrence ra t iona le i s with l i t t l e doubt the most 
widely accepted j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary r u l e . In 
freon. the Supreme Court made clear that i t perceived deterrence 
as the only purpose for the r u l e . 468 U.S. at 906. Numerous 
s t a t e courts have taken a s imilar pos i t i on regarding t h e i r own 
exclusionary r u l e s . See , e . g . . Mers v. S t a t e . 482 N.E.2d 778, 
782-83 (Ind. App. 1985); S ta te v . Wood. 457 So.2d 206, 210-11 
(La. App. 1984); S ta te v. LePage. 102 Idaho 387, 391-92, 630 P.2d 
674, 67«- /y (1981) , c er t , denied. 454 U.S. 1057 (recognizing 
that , although other reasons for i t s use e x i s t , the primary 
purpose of Idaho's exclusionary rule i s t o deter po l ice 
misconduct). The Leon dec i s ion and a number of s ta te court 
opinions, e t g t State v . Brown. 708 So.2d at 146; Stringer v. 
g t a t e . 491 So.2d 837, 847 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J . , 
concurring) , r e f l ec t the majority, and probably better reasoned, 
view that the deterrence ra t iona le , l i k e the other r a t i o n a l e s , 
has no readi ly d i s cern ib l e bas i s in the federal cons t i tu t ion or 
the s ta te c o n s t i t u t i o n s . On the other hand, J u s t i c e Potter 
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Stewart has a r t i cu l a t ed what i s perhaps the most compelling 
counterargument t o tha t view: 
To give effect t o the C o n s t i t u t i o n s prohi-
b i t ion against i l l e g a l searches and se i zu re s , 
i t may be necessary for the judic iary to 
remove the incent ive for v io l a t i ng i t . Thus, 
i t may be argued tha t although the Consti tu-
tion does not e x p l i c i t l y provide for exclu-
sion, the need to enforce the C o n s t i t u t i o n s 
l i m i t s on government—to preserve the rule 
of law—requires an exclusionary ru le . Under 
t h i s th i rd •doc t r ina l" bas is for the exclu-
sionary ru le , which has been described as 
•cons t i tu t iona l common law," the exclusion of 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly obtained evidence i s tiot 
a cons t i tu t iona l r ight but a cons t i tu t iona l 
remedy. I t i s a r ight only in the sense 
that every remedy ves t s a r ight in those 
who may claim i t . 
Stewart, supra at 1384. But even he qua l i f i ed h i s argument by 
s t a t i n g : 
Under such an approach, the determination 
whether the exclusionary ru le i s cons t i tu -
t i ona l ly required tu rns on whether there are 
other adequate remedies avai lable t o ensure 
t ha t the government does not v i o l a t e the 
fourth amendment a t i t s p leasure . 
Assuming t h a t t h i s Court i s among those courts t h a t see 
deterrence of pol ice misconduct as the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary ru le , a reasonable assumption given i t s recent 
adoption of Rule 12(g) (which, as discussed in more de t a i l below, 
i s a de ter rence-or iented , modified exclusionary r u l e ) , the Court 
should e x p l i c i t l y hold tha t an exclusionary r u l e , in any form, i s 
not required e i the r by a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14, or any other 
provision in the s t a t e cons t i t u t ion , on a theory tha t exclusion 
i s a cons t i tu t iona l remedy premised upon the deterrence doct r ine . 
Although J u s t i c e S tewar t ' s cons t i tu t iona l theory regarding the 
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deterrence ra t iona le i s not without some force , by adopting i t 
the Court would unnecessari ly entangle i t s e l f in a l e s s than 
c lear cons t i tu t iona l ana ly s i s . Elevating a quest ion i n t o the 
realm of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l quest ion , when that i s avoidable, i s 
not the preferred course. See State v . Wood, 648 P.2d 71 , 82 
(Utah 1982) , c e r t , denied, 459 U.S. 988. The preferable course 
for t h i s Court would be to do as the Supreme Court did in Leon 
and recognize that t h i s s t a t e ' 6 exclusionary rule—which i s 
embodied in Rule 12(g)—operates as a j u d i c i a l l y created remedy 
designed to safeguard a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 r i g h t s through i t s 
deterrent e f f e c t , rather than a personal cons t i tu t iona l right of 
the aggrieved person. See Leon, 468 U.S. a t 906. Under t h i s 
approach, future modif icat ions of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , including the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t o t a l l y abandoning exc lus ion of evidence as a 
remedy for search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n s , are more e a s i l y 
analyzed and adopted.13 
F ina l ly , although the Court might a l so embrace the 
j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y rat ionale as an addit ional nonconst i tut ional 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary rule, s e e , e . g . , Johnson, 716 
P.2d at 1298, that would not be completely cons i s tent with the 
tenor of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which allows the admission of i l l e g a l l y 
obtained evidence so long as the v i o l a t i o n was insubstant ia l and 
committed in good f a i t h . In short , of the three that have been 
13 por ins tance , i f the Court were to conclude at some future 
date that adequate a l t e r n a t i v e remedies t o the exclusionary rule 
e x i s t , i t could simply abandon the rule through i t s rule-making 
function without having t o expla in why a rule once required by 
the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n was no longer so required. 
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discussed , the deterrence ra t iona le r viewed as a 
nonconst i tut ional doctr ine , provides the c l e a r e s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the exclusionary rule contained in Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
Having addressed the quest ion of whether an 
exclusionary rule i s required under e i ther the fourth amendment 
or a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14, the next quest ion i s whether Rule 12(g) 
i s a permiss ible remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t s r i g h t s 
under the federal and s t a t e prov i s ions . Because a s t a t e i s free 
t o fashion whatever rule i t de s i re s concerning v i o l a t i o n s of i t s 
s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l provis ion that are pot a l so v i o l a t i o n s of 
the fourth amendment, the ana lys i s of t h i s i ssue w i l l focus on 
whether Rule 12(g) provides a permiss ible remedy for v i o l a t i o n s 
of the fourth amendment. By proceeding in t h i s way, the State i s 
assuming that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , b e l i e v e s i t to 
be an acceptable rule under s t a t e law for v i o l a t i o n s of a r t i c l e 
I , s e c t i o n 14. Thus, i f the Court were to determine that cer ta in 
po l i ce conduct v i o l a t e d a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 even though i t did 
not v i o l a t e the fourth amendment, presumably Rule 12(g) would be 
the contro l l ing rule on the i s sue of suppression. 
Under the Mapp ru l ing , as modified by Leon, the 
individual s t a t e s are obl igated t o apply the federal exclusionary 
ru le in cases of a fourth amendment v i o l a t i o n . If federal law 
requires exc lus ion under the f a c t s presented, the s t a t e court 
must exclude the evidence. In short , a s t a t e may not have a more 
narrow exclusionary rule than the federal rule when a fourth 
amendment v i o l a t i o n i s at i s s u e , ptr inoer v. S t a t e , 491 So.2d at 
847 (Robertson, J . , concurring) . Therefore, i t must be 
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determined whether Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which obviously appl ies to 
v i o l a t i o n s of the fourth amendment, can be applied in a manner 
cons i s tent with federal law. 
Rule 12(g) appears t o be a hybrid rule which combines 
the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t suggested by the American Law I n s t i t u t e 
i n i t s MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975) , see 
general ly Coe, supra, and the good f a i t h except ion t o the 
exclusionary rule ar t i cu la ted by the Supreme Court in Leon 
(warrant context) and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United S ta tes v . Williams. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) , cer t , 
denied. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (warrantless contex t ) . I t r e f l e c t s 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with automatic exc lus ion (which does not consider 
what deterrent e f f e c t , i f any, exc lus ion w i l l have in the given 
case) as the remedy for every search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n , the 
cos t s of which can be extremely high. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08; 
Stone v. Powell . 428 U.S. at 490 ("The d ispar i ty in part icular 
cases between the error committed by the po l i ce o f f i cer and the 
windfal l afforded a gu i l t y defendant by appl icat ion of the rule 
i s contrary t o the idea of proport ional i ty that i s e s s e n t i a l t o 
the concept of j u s t i c e . - ) ; Schroeder, supra at 1424-25 
(summarizing the perceived cos t s of the exclusionary rule as 
fo l lows: "(1) fos ter ing delay in the system of j u s t i c e ; (2) 
encouraging po l i ce perjury; (3) d ivert ing the a t t e n t i o n of the 
par t i c ipants in a criminal case from the quest ion of g u i l t or 
Innocence; (4) free ing the g u i l t y ; and (5) generating d i srespect 
for the law and the administration of j u s t i c e by granting 
windfal l b e n e f i t s to certain g u i l t y defendants" (footnote 
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c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ) . Instead, i t re ta ins exc lus ion as a remedy 
for a subs tant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n , recognizing that a 
bene f i c ia l deterrent e f f ec t i s r e a l i z e d through exc lus ion only 
under appropriate circumstances. Thus, Rule 12(g) embraces a 
p r i n c i p l e that was central to the dec i s ion in Leon: avoidance of 
the high c o s t s of the exclusionary rule where exc lus ion would not 
e f f e c t i v e l y deter po l ice misconduct. As s ta ted in Leon: 
[Elven assuming that the rule e f f e c t i v e l y 
deters some po l i ce misconduct and provides 
i n c e n t i v e s for the law enforcement profess ion 
as a whole to conduct i t s e l f in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment, i t cannot be expected, 
and should not be appl ied, to deter object -
ive ly reasonable law enforcement a c t i v i t y . 
468 U.S. at 918-19. ££ . Stewart, supra at 1394 n. 155; Oaks, 
•Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Se izure ," 37 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 665 ( 1 9 7 0 ) — c r i t i c s of the exclusionary rule who 
f o r c e f u l l y argue that i t does not in fact deter unconst i tut ional 
po l i ce conduct. Addi t ional ly , because the rule operates in 
conjunction with UTAH CODE ANN. SS 78-16-1 through -11 (Supp. 
1986) , which provide a c i v i l remedy for the defendant whose 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ights have been v i o l a t e d , * 4 i t s mandate for 
l i m i t e d exc lus ion i s cons i s tent with the wel l reasoned view that , 
if adequate a l t e r n a t i v e remedies e x i s t , exc lus ion becomes l e s s 
necessary. See ^ivens v . Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents# 
403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J. , d i s sent ing) (out l in ing 
an a l t e r n a t i v e remedial scheme to the exclusionary r u l e ) . 
1* An aggrieved defendant could a l s o seek damages from the po l i ce 
o t f i c e r under the federal Civ i l Rights Act , 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
(1982) . 
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Although the language of Rule 12(g) does not precisely 
track the good fa i th exception a r t i cu l a t ed in Leon and Williams, 
the g i s t of Utah's substant ia l i ty /good fa i th rule i s the same as 
that set out in those cases ; and t h i s Court, through case law, 
can ensure tha t i t i s applied in a manner consistent with federal 
law.^5 For ins tance , in Leon the Court a t one point s ta ted in 
reference to appl icat ion of the exclusionary ru le : 
Par t i cu la r ly when law enforcement off icers 
have acted in objective good fa i th or the i r 
t ransgress ions have been minor # the magnitude 
of the benefit conferred on such gui l ty defen-
dants offends basic concepts of the criminal j u s t i c e system. 
468 U.S. at 907-08 (c i t ing Stone v. Powell. 428 U.S. at 490) 
(emphasis added). I t further noted: 
The Court has, to be sure, not seriously ques-
tioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious 
sanction, the continued appl icat ion of the ru le 
to suppress evidence from the [p rosecu t ions ] 
case where a Fourth Amendment v io la t ion has 
been subs tan t ia l and de l ibe ra te . . . . " Franks 
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. 
Ppwelli evpr^r at 492. 
*
5
 Some of the quest ions t h a t were asked the S t a t e ' s counsel 
during oral argument in S ta te v. Mendoza, Case No. 20922 (argued 
June 12, 1986), suggest t h a t cer ta in members of the Court may not 
be e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i ed with the language of Rule 12(g). However, 
i t i s the Court1 s ru l e , and if the ru le i s not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
worded, the Court should amend i t . Aware of the possible 
concerns in t h i s regard, a t torneys from the Attorney General 's 
Otfice plan to meet with represen ta t ives from the Statewide 
Association of Prosecutors and other members of the law 
enforcement community to discuss Rule 12(g) and perhaps pe t i t i on 
for a rule cnange, as the S ta te has done with respect to Utah R. 
Crim. P. 27 (see In Re: Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, S t a t e ' s Pe t i t ion for Amendment to Rule ( f i led February 
19, 1986)). If such a pe t i t i on i s f i l e d , the S ta te wi l l a t that 
same time submit a complete memorandum discussing the 
exclusionary rule and possible a l t e rna t ive s t o i t . But for now, 
the S ta te recognizes t ha t the Court has adopted current Rule 
12(g), and therefore wi l l l imi t i t s discussion here t o the legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for tha t ru l e . 
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I d . at 908-09 (emphasis added). See a lso McFarland v . S t a t e , 284 
Ark* 533, 549 , 684 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1985) ( c i t i n g te&n with 
approval in applying Arkansas* s substant ia l v i o l a t i o n rule for 
suppression of evidence (A.R.Cr.P. 16 .2 (e )—a rule patterned 
a f ter the ALl's s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t ) ) . 
Furthermore, that the Supreme Court has not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y held that the Leon good f a i t h exception would apply 
in a warrantless context , as Rule 12(g) obviously would, the 
Court1 s general d i scuss ion in that case about the propriety of a 
good f a i t h except ion strongly suggests that such an extens ion of 
freon would be both acceptable and des i rab le . See 468 U.S. at 
918-19. 
Some courts have adopted a form of good f a i t h exception 
t o the exclusionary ru le in a warrantless search or se izure 
context . See, e . g . . United S t a t e s v . Wyler, 502 F.Supp. 969, 
973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) . The leading case i s s t i l l Williams where 
the Fifth Circuit held tha t evidence se ized from the defendant 
inc ident t o a warrant less a r r e s t , which was ul t imate ly determined 
to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because "evidence 
i s not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where i t i s 
discovered by o f f i c e r s in the course of act ions that are taken in 
good f a i t h and in the reasonable, though mistaken, b e l i e f that 
they are authorized. • 622 F.2d at 840 . The court analyzed the 
appropriateness of a good f a i t h except ion in much the same way 
that the Supreme Court did in Leon, emphasizing that the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule i s not furthered if 
the ru le i s appl ied t o s i t u a t i o n s where po l i ce o f f i c e r s have 
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acted in the good f a i t h be l i e f that the ir conduct i s lawful . 622 
F.2d at 842. Numerous courts have c i t e d Williams with approval. 
IL,^ United states Vt Cotton* 751 p.2d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (loth cir. 
1985) i Donovan Yt Federal Clearing Pie Cit ing COt# 695 F.2d 
1020, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1982); United S t a t e s y f Nolan, 530 
F.Supp. 386, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1981) , a f f ' d , 718 F.2d 589 (3d Cir . 
1983); S ta te v . Verkuylen, 120 Wis.2d 59, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 
App. 1982) i S ta te v. Glass . 9 Ohio Misc.2d 10 , 1 1 , 458 N.E.2d 
1302, 1304 (Ohio Com. PI. 1983) . In short , the Williams opinion 
embodies the l o g i c a l extens ion of Leon i n t o the area of 
warrantless searches and s e i z u r e s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive 
of any compelling reason why the Supreme Court would not apply 
the Leon rule in a case where an o f f i c e r s warrantless conduct, 
subsequently determined to be in v i o l a t i o n of the fourth 
amendment, was o b j e c t i v e l y reasonable under the circumstances. 
&££ ItNtSt Vt LPP?z-Men$P?ar 468 U.S. 1032, 1055-56 (1984) 
(White, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ; People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1153 
(Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J. , concurring) (observing that 
Colorado's s tatutory "good f a i t h " except ion t o the exclusionary 
rule i s cons i s tent with fourth amendment precedent and does not 
v i o l a t e federal cons t i tu t iona l standards); Bloom, "United S ta te s 
v. Leon And I t s Ramificat ions," 56 Colo. L. Rev. 247, 259-61 
(1985) . £uL J6£JL Unitgfl State? Yt KhiUng* 781 F.2d 692 , 698-99 
(9th Cir . 1986) (refusing t o extend Leon rat iona le to warrantless 
s i t u a t i o n ) ; Greenhalgh, "The Warrantless Good Faith Exception— 
Unprecedented, Indefens ib le , and Devoid of Necess i ty ," 26 S. Tex. 
L.J. 129 (1985) . 
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F i n a l l y , although i t does not bear on the federal 
cons t i tu t iona l i s s u e and r e l a t e s only t o the appropriateness of 
Rule 12(g) under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n (which, as noted e a r l i e r , 
should not be an i s s u e in that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , 
presumably b e l i e v e s that the rule does not create any s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems), i t i s worth noting that a number of 
courts have adopted the Leon good f a i t h exception as part of 
their s t a t e exclusionary r u l e . S ta te v. Brown. 708 So.2d at 145-
46; Mers v . S t a t e . 482 N.E.2d a t 782-83; McFarland v . S t a t e . 284 
Ark. a t 549 , 684 S.W.2d at 243; S ta te v. Wood. 457 So.2d at 210-
11; S ta te v . Bo l t . 142 Ariz. 260 , 689 P.2d 519 (1984) . But see 
People v. Bioelow. 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451 , 457-
58 (1985); S t a t e v. Novenbrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 
(1985); S ta te v. Houston. 359 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 1 9 8 4 ) - -
cases r e j e c t i n g Leon on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds. 
Based upon the foregoing d i scuss ion and the probable 
cause a n a l y s i s s e t forth in subsect ion A, the t r i a l court should 
not have excluded the challenged evidence under Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
There simply was no showing that Caz ier ' s search pursuant to a 
warrant cons t i tu ted a subs tant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n of 
d e f e n d a n t s r i g h t s . The warrant i ssued e i ther was supported by 
probable cause (thus no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n when Cazier 
executed i t ) , or i f determined t o be i n v a l i d due to the technical 
inadequacy of Cazier1 s a f f i d a v i t , was reasonably r e l i e d upon by 
the o f f i c er who, under an objec t ive reasonableness t e s t , had no 
bas i s for b e l i e v i n g that the warrant was i n v a l i d . See UTAH CODE 
42-
